

Message Text

PAGE 01 STATE 014811
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SUBJECT: PREPARATIONS FOR BELGRADE -- POSSIBLE POST-
BELGRADE FOLLOW-UP

REF: (A) STATE 304584; (B) STATE 9708; (C)STATE 10317

1. TRANSMITTED BELOW IS THE LAST IN A SERIES OF
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PAGE 02 STATE 014811

CONTRIBUTIONS (REFTELS) DESIGNED TO STIMULATE ALLIED
THINKING ON QUESTIONS RELATED TO THE BELGRADE MEETINGS
PRIOR TO THE NEXT EXPERTS SESSION AT NATO FEB 7.
LIKE OUR PREVIOUS CONTRIBUTIONS, THIS PAPER, ON
FOLLOW-UP ARRANGEMENTS BEYOND BELGRADE, BUILDS ON
OVERALL OBJECTIVES AND STRATEGY ALREADY DISCUSSED
AT NATO AND ATTEMPTS TO RELATE THEM MORE SPECIFICALLY
TO THE PROBLEM OF POST-BELGRADE FOLLOW-UP. YOU SHOULD
CIRCULATE THE FOLLOWING PAPER IN POLADS NOTING THAT
IT DOES NOT REPRESENT FIXED US VIEWS, AND IS INTENDED

SOLELY AS A BASIS FOR FURTHER ALLIED CONSIDERATION OF FOLLOW-UP AFTER BELGRADE. WE WILL BE INTERESTED IN ALLIED REACTIONS TO OUR IDEAS, WHICH WE WILL TAKE INTO ACCOUNT IN FORMULATING OUR POSITIONS.

2. BEGIN TEXT

--BELGRADE--POST-BELGRADE FOLLOW UP.--

I. INTRODUCTION:

WE CONSIDER THE QUESTION OF FURTHER CSCE FOLLOW-UP AFTER BELGRADE TO BE ONE OF MAJOR SIGNIFICANCE FOR THE FUTURE OF EAST-WEST AFFAIRS. WE BELIEVE IT DESERVES CAREFUL CONSIDERATION BY EXPERTS IN ORDER TO DEFINE THE PROS AND CONS CLEARLY FOR JUDGMENTS AND DECISIONS AT THE POLITICAL LEVEL AT A LATER DATE.

II. ALLIED OBJECTIVES:

THREE BASIC CONSIDERATIONS HAVE BEEN REFLECTED IN ALLIED DISCUSSIONS OF FURTHER CSCE FOLLOW-UP ARRANGEMENTS AFTER BELGRADE. WE BELIEVE THEY DEFINE THE OVERALL OBJECTIVES OF THE NATO COUNTRIES IN FOLLOW-UP AFTER BELGRADE:
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 STATE 014811

--A DESIRE TO BE ABLE TO USE THE CSCE IN THE FUTURE TO ENCOURAGE THE SOVIETS AND EASTERN EUROPEANS TO CARRY OUT THEIR COMMITMENTS IN FIELDS OF INTEREST TO THE WEST, SUCH AS HUMANITARIAN QUESTIONS.

--A WISH TO BE ABLE TO DEVELOP IN THE CSCE CONTEXT FURTHER MULTILATERAL EAST-WEST COOPERATION WHERE THIS IS POSSIBLE AND MUTUALLY BENEFICIAL.

--A CAUTIOUS APPROACH TO PERMANENT INSTITUTIONAL COMMITMENTS OR STRUCTURES, BASED ON A WISH TO AVOID STEPS LEADING TOWARD CREATION OF A PERMANENT PAN-EUROPEAN CONSULTATIVE ORGAN OF A POLITICAL OR SECURITY NATURE.

THESE THREE CONCEPTS ARE CENTRAL TO OUR CONSIDERATION OF ANY FURTHER BELGRADE-TYPE SESSIONS OR EXPERT GROUP MEETINGS AFTER BELGRADE.

III. FURTHER BELGRADE-STYLE FOLLOW-UP MEETINGS:

AT THE BEGINNING OF THE CSCE THERE WAS A BROAD SPECTRUM OF IDEAS ON FOLLOW-UP, RANGING FROM EASTERN AND NEUTRAL COUNTRIES WHO WISHED TO ESTABLISH A

PERMANENT ORGAN, COMPLETE WITH SECRETARIAT, TO
WESTERN STATES WHICH PREFERRED NO FOLLOW-UP

WHATSOEVER. DURING THE CONFERENCE ITSELF, AND
SINCE HELSINKI, THE GAP BETWEEN THE MOST EXTREME
VIEWS APPEARS TO HAVE NARROWED CONSIDERABLY. NO
CSCE STATE IS EXPECTED TO PRESS AT BELGRADE FOR
ESTABLISHMENT OF A PERMANENT ORGAN EQUIPPED WITH
A SECRETARIAT. WHATEVER THEIR LONGER-TERM PURPOSES,
AT LEAST FOR THE PRESENT THE SOVIETS APPEAR TO
HAVE TRIMMED THEIR AIM OF USING CSCE TO MOVE TOWARD
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 STATE 014811

A PAN-EUROPEAN SECURITY ORGAN. THE ROMANIANS AND
YUGOSLAVS ALSO SEEM TO BE SEEKING ONLY A COMMITMENT
IN BELGRADE TO PERIODIC BELGRADE-STYLE MEETINGS
IN THE YEARS FOLLOWING 1977. AT THE OTHER EXTREME,
STATES WITH THE MOST CAUTIOUS ATTITUDES TOWARD
FURTHER FOLLOW-UP APPARENTLY NOW ACCEPT THE NEED AND
SEE SOME USEFULNESS IN HAVING AT LEAST ONE FURTHER
BELGRADE-STYLE MEETING AFTER 1977 IN ORDER TO MAINTAIN
A PROCESS OF EAST-WEST DIALOGUE IN EUROPE AND TO PRESS
FOR FURTHER IMPLEMENTATION AFTER BELGRADE.

(A) PERIODICITY:

ROMANIA, YUGOSLAVIA AND FINLAND ARE THE LEADING
PROponents OF PERIODICITY, WHICH THEY SEE AS ENHANCING
THEIR INDEPENDENCE. THE POSSIBILITY THAT PERIODIC
CSCE MEETINGS WOULD CONTRIBUTE TO THESE COUNTRIES'
INDEPENDENT STATUS SHOULD ALSO BE AN IMPORTANT
CONSIDERATION FOR WESTERN GOVERNMENTS. IN ADDITION,
THE WEST HAS AN INTEREST IN CONTINUING THE PRESSURE
FOR EASTERN COMPLIANCE WITH CSCE COMMITMENTS WHICH
WOULD BE PRODUCED BY THE REGULAR, PERIODIC APPROACH
OF A REVIEW MEETING. OUR POSSIBILITIES FOR
PURSUING MUTUALLY BENEFICIAL MULTILATERAL EAST-
WEST PROJECTS COULD ALSO BE ENHANCED BY PERIODIC
BELGRADE-STYLE MEETINGS. AT THE SAME TIME THERE
IS EVERY REASON TO BELIEVE THAT THOSE STATES WHICH
HAVE AMBITIONS FOR THE INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF THE
CSCE WOULD USE PERIODIC MEETINGS AS THE FOUNDATION
FOR A PROGRESSIVELY MORE ELABORATE STRUCTURE OF
PREPARATORY SESSIONS, EXPERTS GROUPS AND CONFERENCES
WHICH WOULD EVENTUALLY PROVIDE THE RATIONALE FOR
A FULL-FLEDGED SECRETARIAT. SUCH PROGRESSIVE
INSTITUTIONALIZATION COULD BE PROFOUNDLY CONTRARY
TO WESTERN INTERESTS, SINCE IT COULD LEAD TO
INVOLVEMENT OF THE SOVIET UNION IN VIRTUALLY EVERY
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 05 STATE 014811

FACET OF INTERSTATE ACTIVITY IN EUROPE, MOST OF WHICH RELATE IN ONE WAY OR ANOTHER TO THE CSCE AGENDA. DESPITE A CURRENT -- POSSIBLY TACTICAL -- SLACKENING OF SOVIET INTEREST IN INSTITUTIONALIZATION,

WE SHOULD BE CAUTIOUS ABOUT STARTING DOWN THE SLIPPERY SLOPE LEADING TO A SOVIET DROIT DE REGARD OVER AFFAIRS IN WESTERN, AS WELL AS EASTERN EUROPE.

(B) ONE FURTHER MEETING:

AGREEMENT TO ONE FURTHER MEETING WOULD APPEAR TO HAVE MANY OF THE ADVANTAGES OF AN AGREEMENT ON PERIODICITY, WITHOUT REPRESENTING AN OPEN-ENDED COMMITMENT LEADING TOWARD AN UNKNOWN RESULT. SUCH AN ARRANGEMENT WOULD ALSO CARRY THE IMPLICATION THAT THIS POST-BELGRADE MEETING COULD, DEPENDING ON THE STATE OF EAST-WEST RELATIONS, LEAD IN ITS TURN TO ONE FURTHER MEETING, WITH NO STATED ENDING DATE FOR THE SERIES OF BELGRADE-STYLE MEETINGS. THIS NOTION COULD BE USED TO SATISFY THE COUNTRIES WHICH ARE MOST AMBITIOUS FOR A COMMITMENT TO PERIODICITY. WITH REGARD TO THE TIMING OF A SINGLE POST-BELGRADE MEETING, THIS SHOULD BE JUDGED IN THE CONTEXT OF THE LIKELY FURTHER DEVELOPMENT OF EAST-WEST RELATIONS. A MEETING 2-3 YEARS AFTER BELGRADE SEEMS REASONABLE IN PRINCIPLE, BUT OTHER FACTORS, INCLUDING THE DURATION OF THE BELGRADE MEETING ITSELF AND PROGRESS ON OTHER EAST-WEST ISSUES, MAY HAVE AN INFLUENCE ON TIMING.

IV. EXPERTS MEETINGS AFTER BELGRADE:

(1) SEVERAL STATES HAVE SUGGESTED THE POSSIBILITY OF CONVENING EXPERTS SESSIONS AFTER BELGRADE TO CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 06 STATE 014811

DEAL WITH UNRESOLVED ISSUES FROM THE FOLLOW-UP MEETING. ONE SUCH MEETING -- ON THE SWISS PROPOSAL FOR A SYSTEM FOR PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES -- IS ALREADY FORESEEN IN THE FINAL ACT, AND WE EXPECT THE SWISS TO ISSUE INVITATIONS TO A MEETING IN 1978 DURING THE BELGRADE SESSION. NORWAY HAS INFORMED THE ALLIES OF ITS INTENTION TO SEEK AN EXPERTS MEETING ON AIR POLLUTION AFTER BELGRADE; HOWEVER, THIS MEETING IS IN A DIFFERENT CATEGORY SINCE IT WILL BE IN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE ECE. WHILE WE AGREE THAT IT COULD BE IN THE INTEREST OF THE ALLIES TO ACCEPT A LIMITED NUMBER OF EXPERTS MEETINGS, WE TEND TO TAKE A CAUTIOUS APPROACH

TO THIS SUBJECT AND BELIEVE THE ALLIES WILL NEED TO CONSIDER THE IMPLICATIONS CAREFULLY. OUR GENERAL VIEW IS THAT THE FINAL ACT AND ANY UNDERTAKINGS WHICH EMERGE FROM BELGRADE CONSTITUTE AN AMPLE AGENDA FOR

MULTILATERAL EAST-WEST DIPLOMACY AND THAT IMPLEMENTATION OF THIS AGENDA, RATHER THAN FURTHER ORIGINAL WORK, IS NOW CALLED FOR. FURTHERMORE, WE ARE CONCERNED THAT A SET OF CSCE EXPERTS GROUPS COULD TOGETHER AMOUNT TO THE PAN-EUROPEAN POLITICAL SYSTEM WE WISH TO AVOID. WHILE WE MIGHT WISH TO SEE EXPERT WORK CONTINUE ON AREAS OF INTEREST TO US, SUCH AS HUMANITARIAN ISSUES AND INFORMATION, WE CAN EXPECT OTHER COUNTRIES TO SEEK SIMILAR ARRANGEMENTS FOR AREAS OF INTEREST TO THEM, SUCH AS THE MEDITERRANEAN, THE BASKET I PRINCIPLES (THE TREATMENT OF WHICH WOULD INEVITABLY BECOME A POLITICAL, RATHER THAN AN EXPERT DISCUSSION), OR MILITARY SECURITY (WHICH COULD IMPACT NEGATIVELY ON MBFR). GIVEN THE CARDINAL CSCE RULE OF BALANCE AMONG THE SECTIONS OF THE FINAL ACT, IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT TO SUPPORT CREATION OF EXPERTS GROUPS ON CERTAIN SUBJECTS WHILE OPPOSING SIMILAR GROUPS ON SUBJECTS IN WHICH WE ARE NOT INTERESTED. CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 07 STATE 014811

(2) WE SHOULD ALSO CONSIDER THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN NEW PROPOSALS AND PROCEDURAL ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE BELGRADE MEETING, AND POSSIBLE POST-BELGRADE EXPERTS GROUPS. THE SUBMISSION OF TOO MANY NEW PROPOSALS, WHICH THE FOLLOW-UP MEETING MAY NOT HAVE SUFFICIENT TIME TO DEAL WITH, OR PRESENTATION OF UNREALISTIC PROPOSALS WITH LITTLE CHANCE OF ADOPTION AT THE MEETING, COULD CREATE A RATIONALE FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF EXPERTS GROUPS TO DEAL WITH THESE PROPOSALS. SUCH A PROBLEM ALREADY LOOMS, GIVEN THE MULTIPLICITY OF NEW INITIATIVES WE EXPECT FROM THE NEUTRALS AND THE GRANDIOSE PROPOSALS ALREADY ADVANCED BY THE USSR (E.G., THE BREZHNEV-PROPOSED CONFERENCES AND THE WP PROPOSAL FOR A TREATY ON NON-FIRST-USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS). SIMILARLY, THE CREATION OF COMMITTEES IN BELGRADE TO WORK ON SPECIFIC CSCE AREAS WOULD ESTABLISH MECHANISMS WHICH COULD BE TRANSFORMED INTO EXPERTS GROUPS AT THE CONCLUSION OF THE BELGRADE MEETING, ESPECIALLY IF ONE OR TWO DELEGATIONS WITH "SPECIAL INTEREST" PROPOSALS REFUSE TO AGREE TO ADJOURNMENT WITHOUT SATISFACTION.

(3) THUS, WE SHOULD BE ALERT TO THE POSSIBILITY THAT THE DESIRE TO CREATE POST-BELGRADE EXPERTS GROUPS MAY GAIN AN IMPETUS OF ITS OWN IN BELGRADE AS A WAY TO END THE BELGRADE MEETING WITHOUT DROPPING NEW PROPOSALS WHICH SPONSORING COUNTRIES REFUSE TO WITH-

DRAW. WE SHOULD ALSO BEAR IN MIND THE FACT THAT THE

EXISTENCE OF NUMEROUS EXPERT GROUPS COULD CREATE A PERCEIVED NEED FOR A PERMANENT MECHANISM FOR THE COORDINATION OF POST-BELGRADE CSCE ACTIVITIES. IN ADDITION, EXPERT GROUPS WITH BROAD MANDATES COULD DEVELOP IN UNFORESEEN -- AND POSSIBLY UNDESIRABLE -- DIRECTIONS. IN VIEW OF THESE FACTORS WE SHOULD TAKE
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 08 STATE 014811

A CONSERVATIVE APPROACH TO POST-BELGRADE EXPERT GROUPS, AND INSIST ON STRICTLY-DEFINED MANDATES AND TIME LIMITS ON THE WORK OF ANY POST-BELGRADE EXPERT GROUPS, SHOULD SUCH GROUPS BE FORMED.

(4) FINALLY, WE SHOULD REFLECT ON WHETHER NEW WESTERN INITIATIVES, AND ESTABLISHMENT OF EXPERT GROUPS MIGHT BE MORE USEFUL TO US IF HELD IN RESERVE FOR A PERIOD IN THE FUTURE, IF AND WHEN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF WHAT HAS ALREADY BEEN AGREED HAS ADVANCED FURTHER. SHOULD IMPLEMENTATION PROVE MORE SATISFACTORY IN THE FUTURE, ESTABLISHMENT OF EXPERT GROUPS TO STUDY SPECIFIC NEW WESTERN PROPOSALS MIGHT PROVE DESIRABLE AS THE NEXT STAGE IN THE CSCE PROCESS, THUS KEEPING CSCE ACTIVITY FOCUSED ON SPECIFICS.

V. EXISTING INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS:

(1) AN ESSENTIAL ELEMENT IN THE WESTERN POSITION ON FOLLOW-UP DURING THE CSCE WAS THAT EXISTING INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS SHOULD BE USED AS MUCH AS POSSIBLE TO FOLLOW-UP ON AGREED CSCE PROVISIONS. THIS ARGUMENT WAS LARGELY TACTICAL, HOWEVER, SINCE IT WAS INTENDED TO BOLSTER THE WESTERN POSITION THAT AN ELABORATE CSCE FOLLOW-UP MECHANISM WAS NOT REQUIRED. IN FACT, THERE ARE VERY FEW EXISTING INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS WHICH ARE SUITABLE TO FOLLOW-UP ON HELSINKI PROVISIONS. ONLY TWO -- THE ECE AND UNESCO -- ARE RECOGNIZED IN THE FINAL ACT, AND THESE TWO ORGANIZATIONS ARE MANDATED TO FOLLOW ONLY LIMITED PORTIONS OF THE CSCE AGENDA: BASKET II AND CULTURAL, EDUCATIONAL AND SCIENTIFIC EXCHANGES. OUR EXPERIENCE WITH FOLLOW-UP TO CSCE IN THESE ORGANIZATIONS HAS BEEN MIXED, BUT OUR GENERAL APPRAISAL IS THAT IT HAS BEEN SATISFACTORY IN THE ECE, WHOSE MEMBERSHIP AND
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 09 STATE 014811

CONSENSUS PROCEDURES ARE SIMILAR TO THOSE OF THE CSCE, BUT UNSATISFACTORY IN UNESCO, WHERE A BROADER

MEMBERSHIP AND MAJORITY VOTING HAVE LED TO UNHELPFUL INITIATIVES AND HAVE PUT THE WEST IN THE POSITION OF DEFENDING CSCE GAINS FROM VASTLY WEAKER POSITIONS.

(2) WE NEED TO ASSESS WHETHER IT IS IN OUR INTEREST TO MAINTAIN OUR ARGUMENT THAT EXISTING INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS SHOULD BE USED TO FOLLOW-UP ON CSCE AFTER BELGRADE. AN ALTERNATIVE WOULD BE A MORE SELECTIVE APPROACH, SUPPORTING FURTHER CSCE FOLLOW-UP ACTIVITIES ONLY IN ORGANIZATIONS WHERE THE PROCEDURES AND MEMBERSHIP ARE SIMILAR TO THOSE OF CSCE, AND SEEKING TO LIMIT CSCE FOLLOW-UP ACTIVITIES IN OTHER INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS. SUCH A POSITION WOULD NOT, OF COURSE, IMPINGE ON OUR NORMAL ACTIVITIES IN SUCH ORGANIZATIONS, AS LONG AS THEY WERE NOT RELATED TO CSCE.

VI. IMPORTANCE OF BELGRADE EXPERIENCE:

THE BELGRADE MEETING WILL BE A NEW EXPERIENCE, UNLIKE EVEN THE CSCE ITSELF. FOR THIS REASON WE BELIEVE IT WOULD BE UNWISE TO COME TO FINAL CONCLUSIONS REGARDING POSSIBILITIES FOR POST-BELGRADE FOLLOW-UP UNTIL WE HAVE A BETTER IDEA OF THE ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES SUCH MEETINGS MAY ENTAIL. IT MAY ALSO BE ADVANTAGEOUS TO AVOID DRAWING FIRM CONCLUSIONS, OR INDICATING A POSITION ON POST-BELGRADE FOLLOW-UP, FOR TACTICAL REASONS; OUR ATTITUDE ON FURTHER FOLLOW-UP MAY BE USEFUL AS A LEVER FOR ENCOURAGING THE EASTERN IMPLEMENTATION WE DESIRE. WE FOLLOWED A SIMILAR TACTIC DURING THE CSCE, REFUSING TO DISCUSS FOLLOW-UP AT ALL UNTIL THE SUBSTANCE OF THE FINAL ACT HAD BEEN DEFINED CLEARLY ENOUGH TO INDICATE WHAT WAS TO BE FOLLOWED UP. THIS TACTIC WAS SUCCESSFUL
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 10 STATE 014811

IN THOSE CIRCUMSTANCES AND MAY BE USEFUL AGAIN IN BELGRADE. IN CONSIDERING THE POSSIBILITY OF POST-PONING A DECISION ON FURTHER FOLLOW-UP UNTIL WE HAVE A TASTE OF BELGRADE, WE SHOULD BEAR IN MIND THAT OUR PUBLICS, PARLIAMENTS AND PRESS WILL BE KEENLY INTERESTED IN OUR VIEWS ON THIS ISSUE AS THE BELGRADE MEETING PROGRESSES. END TEXT

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